What is the iron law of oligarchy According to the elitist theory?

Abstract

This article shows how Athens in the late fifth and early fourth centuries mitigated Robert Michels' famous "iron law of oligarchy." It is argued that Athens' success is related to its practice of universal male citizen participation in the administration of the city. At several points a comparison is drawn between how the International Typographical Union (ITU), studied in Lipset, Trow, and Coleman's Union Democracy, mitigated the "iron law," and how Athens did so. The purpose of this article, however, is not to draw as many comparisons as possible. It is rather to suggest that the very possibility of comparison implies that the lessons of Athens are still relevant, if properly interpreted. This last clause is important, for it is argued that the way in which mass participation mitigated the iron law at Athens was subtle, and easily misinterpreted, perhaps especially by those who are eager to see greater participation in contemporary Western democracies. /// Cet article montre comment Athènes à la fin du cinquième siècle et au début du quatrième a mitigé la célèbre << loi de fer de l'oligarchie >> de Robert Michel. On soutient que le succès d'Athènes est lié à sa pratique d'une participation universelle des citoyens mâles dans l'administration de la cité. À plusieurs endroits de cet essai, l'auteur compare comment le << International Typographical Union >> (ITU), étudiée dans Union Democracy de Lipset, Trow et Coleman a mitigé la << loi de fer >> et comment Athènes l'a fait. Cependant, le but de cet article n'est pas de tirer autant de comparaisons que possible. C'est plutôt de suggérer que la possibilité même de comparaison implique que les leçons d'Athènes sont encore pertinentes, si on les interprète correctement. Cette dernière proposition est d'autant plus importante que la manière dont la participation de masse mitigeait la loi de fer à Athènes était subtile et aujourd'hui facilement mal interprètée, peut-être surtout par ceux-là qui désirent ardemment voir une plus grande participation dans les démocraties occidentales contemporaines.

Journal Information

Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique is published quarterly, and presents articles, notes, commentaries and book reviews in English and in French. The first objective of CJPS/Rcsp is the publication of outstanding scholarly manuscripts on all areas of political science, including the history of political thought, contemporary political theory, international relations and foreign policy, governmental institutions and processes, political behavior, public administration and public policy. In addition, as a leading omnibus journal, it is the primary publishing outlet for innovative research on all facets of Canadian politics and government. The third major objective of CJPS/Rcsp is publication of communications about current problems, recent research, and future prospects in political science through a review of recent books published by Canadian and non-Canadian authors in all fields of political science as well as comments on articles and replies to comments and field analyses.

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The Canadian Political Science Association was founded in 1913 and incorporated under the Canada Corporation Act in 1971. The objectives of the Association as stated in its Constitution are: To encourage and develop political science and its relationship with other disciplines; To hold conferences, meetings and exhibitions for the discussion of political science problems and the exchange of views in matters relating to political science; To purchase, acquire, take by gift, any devise, bequest, or donation for the objectives of the corporation; To give grants, scholarships or fellowships to deserving individuals, groups of persons or organizations in pursuance of the objects of the corporation; To publish journals, newspapers, books and monographs relating to political science The Association as such, will not assume a position upon any question of public policy not directly related to the discipline of political science or commit its members to any position thereupon.

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Abstract

The debate around Michels's "iron law of oligarchy" over the question of whether organizations inevitably become oligarchic reaches back almost a century, but the concept of oligarchy has frequently been left underspecified, and the measures that have been employed are especially inadequate for analyzing nonbureaucratically structured organizations. A conceptual model is needed that delineates what does and does not constitute oligarchy and can be applied in both bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic settings. Definitions found in the research are inadequate for two reasons. First, treating oligarchy solely as a feature of organizational structure neglects the possibility that a powerful elite may operate outside of the formal structure. A democratic structure is a necessary precondition, but it does not guarantee the absence of oligarchy. Second, studies that equate oligarchy with goal displacement and bureaucratic conservatism cannot account for organizations with radical goals that are nonetheless dominated by a ruling elite. This article presents a model that distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate forms of formal and informal power to define oligarchy as a concentration of illegitimate power in the hands of an entrenched minority. The model is intended for use in organizations that are nominally democratic to determine whether a formal or informal leadership has in fact acquired oligarchic control. By providing a common framework for tracking fluctuations in the distribution and legitimacy of both formal and informal power, it is hoped that this model will facilitate a more productive bout of research on the conditions under which various forms of democratically structured organizations may be able to resist oligarchization.

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Sociological Theory publishes work in all areas of theory, including new substantive theories, history of theory, metatheory, formal theory construction, and synthetic contributions. Peer reviewed and published quarterly, Sociological Theory is renowned for featuring the best international research and scholarship and is essential reading for sociologists.

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American Sociological Association Mission Statement: Serving Sociologists in Their Work Advancing Sociology as a Science and Profession Promoting the Contributions and Use of Sociology to Society The American Sociological Association (ASA), founded in 1905, is a non-profit membership association dedicated to advancing sociology as a scientific discipline and profession serving the public good. With over 13,200 members, ASA encompasses sociologists who are faculty members at colleges and universities, researchers, practitioners, and students. About 20 percent of the members work in government, business, or non-profit organizations. As the national organization for sociologists, the American Sociological Association, through its Executive Office, is well positioned to provide a unique set of services to its members and to promote the vitality, visibility, and diversity of the discipline. Working at the national and international levels, the Association aims to articulate policy and impleme nt programs likely to have the broadest possible impact for sociology now and in the future.

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What is the concept of iron law of oligarchy?

The "iron law of oligarchy" states that all forms of organization, regardless of how democratic they may be at the start, will eventually and inevitably develop oligarchic tendencies, thus making true democracy practically and theoretically impossible, especially in large groups and complex organizations.

What is the iron law of explanation?

Definition of iron law : a law or controlling principle that is incontrovertible and inexorable iron laws of historical necessity.

What is the iron law of oligarchy quizlet?

Iron law of oligarchy. a principle of organizational life under which even a democratic organization will eventually develop into a bureaucracy ruled by a few individuals. master status. a status that dominates others and thereby determines a person's general position in society.