How did the Soviet Union respond when the United States Great Britain and France united their administrative zones within occupied Berlin?
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Abstract Until the 1948–1949 Berlin blockade, the United States had not decided whether U.S. forces should remain in West Berlin after the establishment of a West German government. But after the Soviet Union closed off surface routes to West Berlin, the Truman administration embarked on a massive airlift and established a de facto commitment to preserve the western sectors’ independence. The U.S. guarantee to West Berlin is difficult to explain from the standpoint of realist theories of foreign policymaking. Realism maintains that leaders should undertake commitments only if adequate power is available and that ends should be commensurate with means. West Berlin was indefensible, and its access routes could be restricted at any time. Only by analyzing the decision-making process from the standpoint of political psychology can scholars determine why U.S. policymakers acted as they did. President Harry Truman played a pivotal role in decision-making in Berlin, and he relied on his own judgment rather than policy analysis. Psychological research on intuitive judgment indicates that people sometimes make important decisions without deliberating when the problem is highly complex and the outcome uncertain—precisely the conditions Truman faced in 1948. Show
Journal Information The Journal of Cold War Studies features peer-reviewed articles based on archival research in the former Communist world, in Western countries, and in other parts of the globe. Articles in the journal draw on declassified materials and new memoirs to illuminate and raise questions about numerous historical and theoretical concerns: theories of decision-making, deterrence, bureaucratic politics, institutional formation, bargaining, diplomacy, foreign policy conduct, and international relations. Using the latest evidence, the authors subject these theories, and others, to rigorous empirical analysis. The journal also includes an extensive section of reviews of new books pertaining to the Cold War and international politics. The journal is published by the MIT Press for the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies. Publisher Information Among the largest university presses in the world, The MIT Press publishes over 200 new books each year along with 30 journals in the arts and humanities, economics, international affairs, history, political science, science and technology along with other disciplines. We were among the first university presses to offer titles electronically and we continue to adopt technologies that allow us to better support the scholarly mission and disseminate our content widely. The Press's enthusiasm for innovation is reflected in our continuing exploration of this frontier. Since the late 1960s, we have experimented with generation after generation of electronic publishing tools. Through our commitment to new products—whether digital journals or entirely new forms of communication—we have continued to look for the most efficient and effective means to serve our readership. Our readers have come to expect excellence from our products, and they can count on us to maintain a commitment to producing rigorous and innovative information products in whatever forms the future of publishing may bring. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support . We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader. With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free. Get StartedAlready have an account? Log in Monthly Plan
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journal article The Partition of Germany and the Origins of the Cold WarReview of International Studies Vol. 11, No. 2 (Apr., 1985) , pp. 123-137 (15 pages) Published By: Cambridge University Press https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097039 Read and download Log in through your school or library Alternate access options For independent researchers Read Online Read 100 articles/month free Subscribe to JPASS Unlimited reading + 10 downloads Purchase article $34.00 - Download now and later Journal Information The aim of the Review of International Studies is to promote the analysis and understand of international relations. Its scope is wide-ranging both in terms of subject matter and method. The RIS is designed to serve the needs of students and scholars interested in every aspect of international studies, including the political, economic, philosophical, legal, ethical, historical, military, cultural and technological dimensions of the subject. The editors of the RIS are receptive to the extensive array of methodologies now employed in the humanities and social sciences. Each issue contains research articles and review articles; on occasion, an issue may also include a debating forum, a teaching article and an interview. The Review of International Studies is the official journal of the British International Studies Association. Publisher Information Cambridge University Press (www.cambridge.org) is the publishing division of the University of Cambridge, one of the world’s leading research institutions and winner of 81 Nobel Prizes. Cambridge University Press is committed by its charter to disseminate knowledge as widely as possible across the globe. It publishes over 2,500 books a year for distribution in more than 200 countries. Cambridge Journals publishes over 250 peer-reviewed academic journals across a wide range of subject areas, in print and online. Many of these journals are the leading academic publications in their fields and together they form one of the most valuable and comprehensive bodies of research available today. For more information, visit http://journals.cambridge.org. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. What was the Soviet response when the US France and Great Britain joined their zones on West Berlin?The Soviets viewed these actions as a threat and issued more demands for a say in the economic future of Germany. On June 22, 1948, negotiations between the Soviets, Americans, and British broke down. On June 24, Soviet forces blocked the roads and railroad lines into West Berlin.
How did the United States and Britain responded to the Soviet blockade of Berlin?The United States and United Kingdom responded by airlifting food and fuel to Berlin from Allied airbases in western Germany. The crisis ended on May 12, 1949, when Soviet forces lifted the blockade on land access to western Berlin.
When the United States Britain and France merged their zones of Germany in 1948 the Soviet Union responded by?U.S., Britain, and France merged their zones in 1948 to create an independent West German state. The Soviets responded by blockading land access to Berlin. The U.S. began a massive airlift of supplies that lasted almost a year.
What was the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States at the close of WWII?Although relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had been strained in the years before World War II, the U.S.-Soviet alliance of 1941–1945 was marked by a great degree of cooperation and was essential to securing the defeat of Nazi Germany.
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